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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

SMITH v. STATE: DEFENSE COUNSEL IS ENTITLED TO
COMMENT ON THE CHALLENGES OF CROSS-RACIAL
IDENTIFICATION AT CLOSING ARGUMENT WHEN THE
SOLE BASIS FOR CONVICTION IS EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY

By: Bryan Davis

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that defense counsel is
entitled to argue the fallibility of cross-racial identification in closing
argument when the sole piece of evidence introduced against the
defense is eyewitness testimony. Smith v. State, 388 Md. 468, 880
A.2d 288 (2005). The Court found the victim's testimony regarding
her enhanced ability to recognize faces had raised the issue of crossracial identification. As defense counsel is given the right to discuss
all evidence raised during trial in closing argument, the trial court's
denial of that right was an abuse of discretion and sufficient grounds to
reverse the convictions ofboth defendants. /d.
Christine Crandall ("Crandall"), a white female, was held up at
gunpoint by two black males in an attempt to steal her car. A struggle
ensued for her car keys, and Crandall called out to a neighbor to
summon the police. The two men then walked away, but allegedly
turned to face the victim before leaving the area. Approximately two
weeks after the incident, Crandall viewed a series of photo arrays at
the police station and identified James Smith ("Smith") and John
Mack ("Mack") as the two men who had accosted her. With regard to
Mack's photo, Crandall noted that despite a difference in hairstyle,
"He looks very much like the man who had the gun and attempted to
rob me." After viewing Smith's photo, Crandall wrote, "This looks
like the man wearing the hat that attempted to rob me." Based on
Crandall's identification, Smith and Mack were arrested and charged
with a series of offenses.
Prior to trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, counsel for
Smith and Mack jointly submitted a motion in limine requesting the
jury be instructed on the challenges of cross-racial eyewitness
identification. The judge denied the motion and precluded the parties
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from raising the issue during opening statements. Defense counsel
again attempted to raise the issue of cross-racial identification before
closing arguments, but were denied permission to raise the issue in
summation. The jury later found both defendants guilty of attempted
robbery, assault, and attempted theft.
Smith and Mackjointly appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland for review of the lower court's treatment of the cross-racial
identification issue. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland upheld
the lower court's ruling and held the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on cross-racial identification.
Additionally, the Court held that the lower court correctly excluded
any discussion of cross-racial identification from closing argument
because no evidence had been produced at trial to suggest that crossracial identification was an issue. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted the defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland was asked to address whether
the trial court erred either when it refused to give a jury instruction
regarding the challenges of cross-racial identification or when it
precluded the defense from discussing cross-racial identification in
closing argument. Smith, 388 Md. at 477, 880 A.2d at 293. The Court
of Appeals of Maryland did not reach the jury instruction issue
because it found sufficient grounds to reverse on the closing argument
issue. !d. at 478, 880 A.2d at 293.
The Court's opinion rested on the foundation that a criminal
defendant, under both Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
will have the benefit of summation by defense counsel. !d. at 486, 880
A.2d at 298 (citing Holmes v. State, 333 Md. 652, 658-59, 637 A.2d
113, 116 (1994)). To determine whether this right was violated by the
limits placed on defense counsel's closing argument during trial, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland utilized the parameters announced in
Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404,326 A.2d 707 (1974).
Wilhelm states, "As to summation, it is, as a general rule, within the
range of legitimate argument for counsel to state and discuss the
evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be
drawn from the facts in evidence; and such comment or argument is
afforded a wide range." !d. (quoting Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 412-13, 326
A.2d at 714). Additionally, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that during closing argument, counsel may make mention of ideas and
concepts that would be considered common knowledge even if such
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ideas have not been entered into evidence. Smith, 388 Md. at 487, 880
A.2d 299 (citing Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 438, 326 A.2d at 728).
The Court first looked to determine whether comment on crossracial identification would have been proper under the commonknowledge prong. Smith, 388 Md. at 488, 880 A.2d at 300. In making
that determination, the Court reviewed leading social research on the
ability of witnesses to identify individuals of another race. !d. at 47985, 880 A.2d at 294-98. Experts note that while there seems to be
agreement that certain races are impaired in their ability to identify
members of another race, the evidence is far from conclusive. Id. at
479, 880 A.2d at 294 (citing John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike:
The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial Identifications, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L.
207, 211 (Spring 2001)). This lack of conclusive evidence about ownrace bias led the Court to find that difficulty in cross-racial
identification is not a matter of common knowledge and therefore not
subject to comment in closing argument. Smith at 488, 880 A.2d at
300.
The Court then examined whether comment on cross-racial
identification was appropriate because it was either a discussion of
evidence or a legitimate inference from facts established at trial. Id.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland argued that Crandall's testimony
had indeed raised the issue of cross-racial identification. Smith at 48889, 880 A.2d at 300. The witness testified that she was "extremely
good with faces," and that she was "obsessed" with observing people
and their postures as a result of her interest in art and painting people.
Id. at 488, 880 A.2d at 300.
Noting that eye-witness identification was the only significant
evidence linking the defendants to the crime, the Court held that
Crandall's testimony did raise the issue of cross-racial identification
and should have opened the door for defense counsel to discuss the
issue during closing argument. Id. at 489, 880 A.2d at 300. The denial
of defense counsel's ability to comment on the issue was a reversible
error. Id.
Judge Harrell's dissenting opinion criticized the majority for
creating a rule that gives judges and attorneys little guidance for
implementation and enforcement. Id. at 497, 880 A.2d at 305.
Additionally, the dissent voiced concern regarding the possibility that
jurors may be misled by cross-racial identification arguments that are
not based on conclusive research. Id. at 498, 880 A.2d at 305.
In conclusion, as it seems the Court is willing to review cases in
which discussion of cross-racial identification has been excluded,
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defense attorneys should seize the moment and preserve the record
whenever possible as it pertains to this issue. Conversely, prosecutors
should be mindful that their cases may be derailed by the cross-racial
identification issue when eyewitness testimony is the only evidence
offered and the victim and defendant are of different races. Finally, it
seems that the Court's decision in this case endorses defense counsel's
use of inconclusive research about cross-racial identification whenever
eyewitness testimony is a crucial component of a case. Courts will
need to be vigilant to ensure that counsel does not mislead future juries
about the strength of the research in an effort to invalidate otherwise
reliable eyewitness identifications.

